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Abstract
The practice of implementing infrastructure projects through a public-private partnership 
(PPP) arrangement is widely employed around the world with successful outcomes. However, 
this practice is not without challenges related to cost, time and quality variations, which the 
public is forced to bear. This study aims to explore factors influencing the termination of the 
East West Link project in Melbourne and present time and cost variation challenges facing 
the Sydney Light Rail project. This paper utilizes literature, investigating the critical success 
factors (CSF) for PPP infrastructure projects in an international context, and other readily 
available data sources such as Australian government publications, the case projects’ reports, 
news articles, and websites as the sources of data. The data gathered from these sources 
was then analysed to understand the project challenges and to investigate the relationship 
between CSF and the challenges. Four challenges were identified, including insufficiency of 
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the business case, political interference, non-independence of implementing organizations 
and insufficient risk profile identification. The findings can assist to cover the loopholes 
that might cause similar failures in project planning, risk management, and policy and 
guideline frameworks. However, efforts should be made in improving the existing policies to 
accommodate political interests as part of risk measures under the national PPP guidelines.  
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Introduction 
The practice of using the public-private partnership (PPP) model for the delivery of big 
projects in Australia has been around for more than 20 years (Wilson, Pelham, and Duffield, 
2010). Australia is one of many countries in the world that successfully employ the practice 
of PPP (Cheung, Chan and Kajewski, 2012). To improve the implementation of PPP 
projects, countries have developed policies, guidelines, frameworks, and broad experience 
to successfully realize PPP infrastructure projects. The National Public Private Partnership 
Guidelines (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008) policies and laws have been developed by the 
Australian Federal and State Governments to help people understand and run PPP projects 
successfully. However, despite the extensive knowledge and resources available, Australia 
is still experiencing unsuccessful practices in implementing some of its PPP infrastructure 
projects. The 2015 termination of Melbourne’s largest infrastructure project, ‘East West 
Link’ (Victorian Auditor General’s Office, 2015)(VAGO), and the current challenges facing 
another large project in the state of New South Wales (NSW), the ‘Sydney Light Rail’, are 
both examples of  PPP arrangements within this environment of expertise in project planning, 
delivery and years of experience, where one would expect such projects to be implemented 
successfully, with minor or zero challenges. However, none of the previous researchers have 
investigated why some PPP projects are not successful despite Australia’s many years of 
experience in delivering PPP projects successfully. All PPP infrastructure projects in Australia 
undergo a thorough screening against potential risks before they are ready for execution. 
However, some projects fall short during the implementation process as indicated above. 
The termination of the East West Link (EWL) project in 2015 resulted in a loss of $0.78 
billion (VAGO, 2015). Similarly, the continuing criticisms of the Sydney Light Rail (SLR) 
project for time and cost overrun (O’Sullivan, 2018b), with other undocumented effects on 
businesses and residents, calls for experts’ attention to investigate the reasons behind these 
difficulties. Financially, Australia expects to spend about $75 billion within the next ten years 
on infrastructure (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017). Similarly, the national infrastructure 
audit report of 2015 revealed that spending on infrastructure was 13.3% of GDP in 2011 of 
which over 70% was ascribed to transportation. According to the Victoria’s Auditor General’s 
report on the EWL project (VAGO, 2015), the project failed before actual work started 
on site and was terminated in June 2015 when more than $1.1 billion had been spent. The 
state government expected to recover only 29% of that expenditure. Similarly, the Sydney 
Light Rail project is reported to undergo an extension of time for reasons related to project 
misinformation (O’Sullivan, 2018a). Nonetheless, the adoption of critical success factors can 
increase the successful completion of the above two PPP projects. However, no study was 
Mwakabole, Gurmu, Tivendale
Construction Economics and Building,  Vol. 19, No. 158
conducted to identify which success factors were not implemented in the EWL and SLR 
projects, and in other PPP projects in general. Thus, the objectives of this study are to identify 
the challenges faced by Australian PPP infrastructure projects by considering EWL and SLR 
as case studies and to map the challenges with the potential PPP critical success factors. In 
this study, the term challenges refer to several issues including problems, shortcomings, and 
risks that are associated with the running of PPP infrastructure projects. 
Literature review 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a non-traditional way of project procurement where the 
public work together and share resources with the private sector on key projects. It can also 
be described as a government contract with a private sector to design, build, finance, maintain 
infrastructure and provide service (NSW Government, 2015). The Australian National PPP 
policy framework recommends the use of PPP when the capital cost of a project is above 
$50 million (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). The practice of PPP in today’s project 
procurement has been increasing and seems to be more significant in the cities where there 
is high population growth that overwhelms a government’s capacity to provide necessary 
infrastructure as needed. In China alone, Beijing had about 2,400 infrastructure projects in the 
period between 2006 -2010, an average of 600 projects every year (Chan, et al., 2010b). Such a 
large number of projects is difficult to be delivered by the government alone. Thus, PPP can be 
considered as an option in delivering such a volume of projects. However, Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski (2012), caution that PPPs are not a cure for all problems and they are not suitable 
for all project settings. Diverse types of PPP have been practiced with success and some with 
failures due to a range of factors depending on the objective of the project (Zhang, 2005). 
PPP projects are costly, time-consuming and service related. During implementation, there 
are associated challenges that lead to unsuccessful results. Nonetheless, the implementation 
of critical success-factors could alleviate the problems posed by these challenges. Numerous 
studies have been carried out to find critical success factors affecting PPP projects as discussed 
below. 
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS (CSF) IN PPP PROJECTS 
Critical success factors (CSF) are those factors that influence the effective implementation 
of the project (Spalek, 2005). Scholars describe CSF as common in developed countries like 
Australia, Europe and North America where there are stable economies and sound governance 
structures, leaving out developing countries which are suffering from lack of knowledge, 
technology, and weak economies to support proper PPP engagement. It has been well 
documented that CSF for PPP infrastructure projects can be achieved through diverse ways 
depending on the nature of the project. Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) found that success factors 
for PPP that are common between Hong Kong, Australia, and the United Kingdom relate 
to good legal framework, public and private sector commitment, strong and worthy private 
associations, appropriate risk sharing and allocation between parties, and stable microeconomic 
conditions. 
According to Zhang (2005), the five CSF for PPP projects are related to economic viability 
of the project indicated by the projected returns from the investment or services provided, 
proper allocation of risks to those parties best able to bear those risks, financial capability 
to support the whole life-cycle cost of the project, well-structured private consortiums with 
technical strengths, and an investment environment that gives confidence for the investors 
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to feel safe to invest.  Similarly, Chan et al., (2010a) in looking at CSF for PPP projects in 
China, developed 18 CSF out of which 5 appeared to be common. Hsueh and Chang, (2017) 
described 26 CSF for PPP while looking at Taiwan infrastructure and created 4 common 
groups out of 26. Those are a supportive/good legal framework, public support, conducive 
investment environment and appropriate selection of PPP projects. Similarly, Ismail (2013) 
found 18 CSF from the Malaysian PPP projects perspective and listed 5 main factors. The 
main factors were good governance, commitment, and responsibility of public and private 
sectors, sound legal structure, favorable economic policies and accessibility of the financial 
market. Chan, et al., (2010a) studied CSF for PPP projects in Beijing and Hongkong 
administrative zones and found factors that were different from other developed countries 
like the United Kingdom, Australia, and America due to the government structure and policy 
system of China. Among the similar factors between Beijing and Hong Kong were lengthy 
delays in negotiations, inexperience and lack of appropriate skills, lengthy delays due to 
political debates and termination of projects before contract signing.
Wang, et al., (2018) on their evaluation of the CFS, found that four common CSF that 
relates to PPP implementation were efficient payment mechanisms, long term demand for 
service, well-structured and trustworthy partnership, and proper risk allocation. The above 
CSF reveals similarities and differences due to the context of the project. Similarities found 
above are related to good governance, stable microeconomic environment, proper allocation 
and sharing of risks, financial capability and commitment of both public and private sectors as 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Summary of Critical Success factors of PPP Projects.
Main Critical Success Factor Author(s) 
Stable microeconomic environment Hsueh and Chang, 
(2017)
Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski, (2012)
Shared responsibility between parties in PPP – 
identification of areas where the public or private can 
cover one another.
Zhang (2005)
Chan, et al., (2010a)
Proper allocation of risks in contracts – identification of 
projects risks and allocating to the most suitable party
Zhang (2005)
A transparent and efficient process of procurement Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski (2012)
Stable social environment – public support on projects 
and understanding   
Ismail (2013)
Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski (2012)
Chan, et al., (2010a)
Stable political environment – Adherence to the rule 
of law, a democratic environment without institutional 
interference. 
Ismail S (2013)
Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski (2012)
Chan, et al., (2010b)
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Main Critical Success Factor Author(s) 
Judicious state mechanism Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski (2012)
Chan, et al., (2010a)
Financial capability - the ability to seek financial 
partners to support projects internally or externally.
Hsueh and Chang (2017)
Ismail (2013)
Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski (2012)
Well-structured private consortiums with technical 
strengths – the ability to seek qualified personnel, 
skills, equipment, and technology to support the 
project.
Zhang (2005)
Chan, et al., (2010a)
Worthwhile investment environment – safer conditions 
for local and offshore investments.
Ismail (2013)
Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski (2012)
Public and private sector commitment – having 
a common goal towards project realization while 
maintaining their distinct roles 
Ismail S (2013)
Cheung, Chan and 
Kajewski (2012) 
Chan, et al., (2010a)
Good legal framework – stable and well-structured 
legal framework to safeguard investors and offer 
confidence 
Hsueh and Chang (2017)
Ismail (2013) 
Zhang (2005)
Chan, et al., (2010b)
However, Rwelamila, Fewings, and Henjewele (2015) identified factors which were not 
addressed by others including the relationship between the public and private sector and 
the identification of the real public sector. In the majority of democratic nations, public 
representation starts from civilians who vote for politicians, then politicians form the 
government. The public commitment required in engaging in contracts with the committed 
private partner is somehow undermined so that the private partners are more likely to drive a 
project and defend their position than the public partners. 
GATEWAY REVIEWS
To maximize the successes of infrastructure projects in Australia, a statutory independent 
body was formed under the Infrastructure Australia Act 2008 with a mandate towards 
prioritizing and progressing national significant infrastructure (Infrastructure Australia, 2016). 
Infrastructure Australia (IA) conducted autonomous research on infrastructure development 
for 15 years rolling out schedules and issuing advice to all levels of government, investors, 
and owners of infrastructure. It developed short and exhaustive assurance reviews that assist 
successful project delivery, among them is the ‘gateway review process’ (assurance practice) led 
by independent reviewers from the public and private sector. Gateway Reviews complement 
the work of other government approval processes and act as an independent advisor 
throughout the project. As shown in Table 2, gateway reviews are not audit processes, nor do 
they take the responsibilities of an entity on project implementation. They assist the delivery of 
projects in accordance with the agreed objectives (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017). 
Table 1 continued
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Table 2 Six Gateway reviews (decision Points) at various critical stages of a Project.
Critical Stages Focus area
Gate 0 Business 
need
Adequate assurance of scope, purpose, and benefits
Gate 1 Business case Assurance of business approach that can be clearly 
defined, quantified and delivered within the timeframe.
Gate 2 Delivery 
strategy 
Assurance of project plan and implementation is clearly 
captured in procurement strategy and process
Gate 3 Investment 
decision 
Assurance of benefit management strategies and plans 
are well incorporated 
Gate 4 Readiness for 
service 
Assurance of organizational readiness before delivery 
through evaluation of ongoing performance and benefits
Gate 5 Benefit 
realization 
Measuring the expectations for the future, building 
remedial actions to combat any potential risks.
Research methodology
The methodology in this paper adopts a case study approach, investigating projects carried out 
in Australia’s two biggest cities, Melbourne and Sydney. The paper utilizes a literature review of 
CSF for PPP infrastructure projects, using readily available data sources, such as government 
publications, reports, journal articles, media, and websites. Data gathered from these sources 
were then analysed to map the challenges faced by the case study projects and the potential 
CSF. The case study approach is preferred mostly for explanatory research that deals with 
functional relationships drawn over time instead of mere incidences or random occurrences 
(Yin, 2011). In this paper, an in-depth case study review was conducted to detect the primary 
challenges faced by the EWL project in Melbourne, which resulted in its termination. Our 
review also explored the current challenges faced by the SLR project, which are causing major 
delays and incurring high unexpected costs. The two projects were chosen as case studies for 
this paper due to the following attributes:
• Public attention due to projects’ cost and completion time challenges
• Political intervention/interest
• Public outcry regarding social and environmental impacts 
• High development costs involved
• The enormous size of the projects
To identify the challenges faced by the two case projects, this study utilized publicly available 
information such as basic project details, information on the management process and project 
development framework. Further, publications regarding the public’s opinion and reaction to 
the development of the projects were reviewed. A similar approach was used by Stewart and 
Nicholson (2003) to study the EWL project. The content analysis of the data from the two 
case studies was carried out and lists of the challenges were developed. The CSF obtained 
from the literature were then related to the identified challenges. Consequently, discussions 
of results relating to the challenges of CSF were conducted. A similar approach was used by 
Roehrich, Lewis and George (2014) as well as Chan, et al. (2010b) when looking at the health 
and obstacles facing PPP projects respectively. 
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Analysis of the case studies 
EAST-WEST LINK PROJECT – MELBOURNE 
The East-West Link (EWL) project was among the largest projects ever proposed in Australia 
(VAGO, 2015). An 18km road across Melbourne, connecting the Eastern Freeway at Hoddle 
street to City Link, the Port of Melbourne area and the Western ring road at Sunshine West. 
At an estimated cost of $8-10 billion, the project was due for completion in December 2019. 
The EWL project was divided into three sections; the Eastern Section, City Link, and the 
Western Section. This study investigates Stage I of the project where the State government 
of Victoria entered into a PPP development agreement with a private consortium to deliver 
the project. In compliance with the National PPP policy and guidelines, the Victorian State 
government developed its own guidance for projects that focuses on financial analysis inputs, 
financing options, and contract management. This guidance on PPP projects is consistent with 
the high-value high-risk assurance process as well as gateway reviews through the approval 
process of PPP projects (VAGO, 2015) as shown in Table 3. According to the Victorian 
Auditor General’s report, decision making on the EWL project and its management was 
mainly undertaken by the government itself through processes put in place to verify project 
value (VAGO, 2015). Process and responsible entities for approval and decision-making were:
• Cabinet process including the decision by State Premier and Treasury – decides under 
advice from the Minister for Roads and relevant departments and agencies.
• Major Transport Facilitation Act 2009 was used during the EWL project for planning 
assessment, delivery approval and timeline certainty by the Minister for Planning.
• Establishment of Linking Melbourne Authority (LMA) accountable to Minister for 
Roads, to manage complex road projects. LMA was involved in all processes from initial 
EWL project development to contract negotiation.
• LMA was abolished in January 2015 following the suspension of EWL project.
Table 3 Sequence of Events from inception to termination of the EWL Project 
(decision timeline).
Date Activity
Apr 2008 Report recommendation for 18kms to provide an alternative to West 
Gate Bridge ‘Investing in Transport: EWL Needs Assessment’
Nov 2010 State Election (Change of Government)
Nov 2011 EWL project proposal submitted to Infrastructure Australia 
Dec 2012 Eastern Section of EWL subjected to ‘Major Transport Projects 
Facilitation Act 2009 (MTPFA)’ assessment, approval, and delivery 
requirements.
Apr 2013 The government approved the Eastern Section business case, $7.96 
billion allocated. 
Approved submission to Infrastructure Australia and availability of 
PPP.
May 2013 Funding for EWL project allocated in State Budget for 2013 - 2014
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Date Activity
Jun 2014 Federal Government issued $1.5 Billion for EWL subject to MoU on its 
use. 
Minister’s project approval under MTPFA.
Jul 2014 Minister’s approval decision challenged in court by Yarra City Council 
and Moreland
Sep 2014 Contract signed.
East West Connect (EWC) Consortium appointed by the State 
government to finance, design, construct, operate and maintain the 
project after winning a competitive tender.
The contract included clause 58 regarding the potential impact of a 
legal challenge concerning the soundness of the planning approval 
decision of the project.
The opposition announced to cancel the project if elected.
Nov 2014 State Election (Change of Government).
Dec 2014 Opposition Party (Labour) won and issued an instruction to suspend 
works on EWL.
Negotiations to terminate the contract started.
Apr 2015 State agreement with EWC to facilitate contract termination.
Jun 2015 EWL contract terminated.
Costs at termination; more than $1.1 billion including planning, 
development, procurement, and termination.
The state expects to recover $320 million through re-selling of 
properties. 
EWL challenges
The implementation of the EWL project was surrounded by several challenges from the 
public, experts and politicians. Those challenges include:
• Legal advice offered to the Victorian State Premier by a parliamentarian member to 
delay the signing of the contract. This was based on the knowledge of an unresolved 
legal challenge regarding the planning approval of the project from the Supreme Court 
of Victoria.
• The contractor’s concern about the possibility and capacity of the Government to sign 
a contract while there were pending issues in the Supreme Court, which could cause 
project delays or cancellation. 
• Public outcry and street rallies condemning the government as the project’s business case 
did not offer a good justification for the government to enter into a contract (Lidberg, 
2014). The project’s cost-benefit ratio was $0.45 for every dollar spent and the cost of 
construction was very high, leading to about 56 years of investment returns as compared 
to other similar projects such as City-link (8 years) and East-Link (20 years).
• In the lead up to the 2014 State elections, as shown on the decision timeline, the 
opposition party promised to cancel the project without conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis to support their decision (VAGO, 2015).
Table 3 continued
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SYDNEY LIGHT RAIL (SLR) 
As part of its initiative to improve transport in Sydney, the NSW State Government rolled 
out a long-term Transport Master Plan for Sydney through PPP procurement (NSW 
Government, 2015). The following are the project’s key facts:
• 12 kms - Circular Quay to Sydney’s south-eastern suburb (CBD South East light rail).
• Costs: $2.1 billion.
• Contract term: December 2014 to March 2034.
• Private partner is responsible for design, construction, operation, and maintenance.
Infrastructure and Structured Finance Unit (ISFU) is the NSW State organization that 
deals with PPP projects under the office of Treasury (Spencer, 2008). The ISFU advice the 
government during all stages of PPP procurement including: 
• Strategic Business Case development
• Contract Execution and Financial close, and 
• Post Contract matters. 
The ISFU observe and is responsible for the National PPP policy and guidelines, as well as 
the NSW PPP guidelines (NSW Government, 2017). The SLR decision timeline is shown in 
Table 4. However, while the project was underway, misleading information provided by the 
public partner during procurement caused problems and affected the project’s implementation 
(O’Sullivan, 2018b).
Table 4 Sequence of activities on the Sydney Light Rail Project from start to date.
Date Activity description Outcomes
Project Planning
Mar 2011 NSW Government commitment to 
building light rail in the CBD
Feasibility studies conducted 
Aug 2011 Transport NSW start a strategic 
plan
Developed a strategic plan
Nov 2012 Strategic plan for light rail 
completed 
Shortlisted route outlines  
Nov 2013 NSW government announce the 
business case
Capital cost: $1.6 billion 
Benefit worth $40 billion 
Project Procurement
Jun 2014 Transport NSW award contracts Essential early works
Oct 2014 Preferred bidder (ALTRAC) 
announced by the NSW government 
as part of PPP
For design, construct, operate 
and maintenance of the project 
Dec 2014 NSW Government announce 
modifications and signed contract  
Capita costs increased to $2.1 
billion
Project delivery/construction
Feb 2015 Transport NSW complete project 
financing agreement with ALTRAC
Financial close
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Date Activity description Outcomes
Jul 2015 ALTRAC assume responsibilities Operation and maintenance of 
light rail services
Oct 2015 Major works Main construction works 
started 
2016 - 
2019
Major works Expected completion of 2018
Passenger service expected to 
start Mar 2019
SLR challenges
During the implementation of the project, certain sections of the rail line were found to 
have utilities along the line, which affected the contractor’s planned activities as well as the 
health and safety of workers (O’Sullivan, 2018b). The government informed the contractor 
that a different company was contracted to handle utility re-allocation along the project line. 
However, it was later discovered that utility relocation was not contracted to any company. 
That event led to the following project challenges:
• The contractor filed a case in the Supreme Court claiming compensation of $1.2 billion 
and a time extension of about 12 months (O’Sullivan, 2018a). 
• The NSW Government planned to ‘buy out’ the project due to fears that the 
construction contractor might be running out of funds.
• SLR contractor staged a ‘go slow’ approach in order to push the government to agree to 
pay more money for the project. 
• Public outcry on the financial loss to businesses along the project area (Casben, Live, and 
Cockburn, 2018). 
With the above observations on the project, Table 5 shows the implied contractual changes 
that would be made to the SLR project to date. It can be seen from the table that the main 
challenges facing the project are also key issues in the project business case development 
and are subject to gateway reviews for screening prior to implementation. It is important to 
determine if the origins of these challenges were new or unknown to the government.
Table 5 Comparison of agreed project cost and time against the contractor’s claim.
Contract Particulars Original Expected revision Remarks 
Contract Sum $2.1 Billion $3.3 Billion 52% increase 
Estimated completion time March 2019 March 2020 1 Year Extension
Results and discussion 
This section presents the main findings and discusses factors that have contributed to the 
termination of the East-West Link (EWL) project, current challenges facing the Sydney light rail 
(SLR) project and their relationship to the scholar’s perspectives on the PPP critical success 
factors.
Table 4 continued
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The first factor found to relate to the termination of the EWL project was the failure of the 
environmental impact assessment to include areas that were to be affected by the project on 
design, heritage sites, crown land, pollution and information on flora and fauna species which 
are protected by law (Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988).  Secondly, immediately before the 
signing of the contract, the government was reluctant to accept advice from the president of 
the Public Transport Users Association (PTUA) not to enter into a contract (Morton, 2014). 
Despite the efforts to persuade the delay of signing until the court hearing could be finalized, 
the government signed the contract, promising to compensate the contractor if anything went 
wrong. The contractor themselves provided similar advice to wait until the finalization of the 
court hearing. A further factor was the lack of accountability by those responsible for project 
appraisal. The contract was entered with deficiencies that were known well in advance of the 
contract signing and where the expectation is that technical experts and government officials 
would provide appropriate advice to address the threats. The final factor that contributed to the 
termination of the EWL project was that of political challenges and interest, given that the 
contract was signed only a few months before the State elections of 2014. The opposition party 
promised to abandon the project during the election campaign, and, upon their election, the 
project was terminated. 
For the SLR project, the first factor was found to be insufficient availability of critical 
project information causing the contractor to not fully examine the site conditions and its 
challenges regarding utilities along the line. Secondly, there were indirect damages to the 
public in terms of loss of business and disturbance to daily life. About 60 business owners 
along the project site have combined to sue the NSW government for delay in project 
completion and consequent continuing damage to their businesses and lives (Casben, Live, 
and Cockburn, 2018). A further factor was the lack of professional accountability within state 
infrastructure teams in observing and addressing the project’s critical path regardless of the 
circumstances behind the project.  The final factor that contributed to the challenges facing 
the SLR project was political interest as the NSW government was aware of the existence of 
utilities along the line and deceived the constructor leading them to underestimate project cost 
and completion time during the tendering process.
Therefore, based on the review of CSF for PPP projects in Australia, four CSF were found 
related to the challenges seen in the EWL and SLR projects as shown in Table 6.
Table 6 Critical success factor with their impact on projects
Critical success factor East West Link Sydney Light rail
Public Private Public Private
Shared responsibilities 
between parties in 
PPP
No Yes No Yes
Proper allocation of 
risks in contracts
No Yes No Yes
Public and private 
sector trustworthy  
No Yes No Yes
Stable political 
environment
The project was used as 
part of political mileage 
towards elections
Project deficiencies were 
ignored to improve public 
perceptions of government.
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Discussion of the CSF shown in Table 6 is based on their impact on both projects, EWL and 
SLR. The governments in both cases appeared to ignore part of their shared responsibilities 
as public partners within a PPP. This lack of accountability was evident in the failure to 
undertake a comprehensive environmental impact assessment of the EWL project and the 
failure to appraise sufficiently the business case on the SLR project. The proper allocation 
of risk, including appropriate risk identification, allocation, and sharing between parties 
make this CSF important (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). Both states’ governments showed 
shortfalls in making proper decisions on known risks as compared to contractors. Furthermore, 
both governments were less trustworthy when compared to contractors. The act of signing 
a contract with known risks and providing deceptive information to the contractor while 
knowing the impact this might cause for both EWL and SLR projects respectively indicates 
the lack of trustworthiness of the state governments. A stable political environment 
appeared as a shortcoming on both projects due to the impact and political mileage these 
big infrastructure projects can provide. The EWL project was canceled to fulfil an election 
campaign promise by the opposition party. In the SLR project, one could conclude that the 
need to ease infrastructure in the CBD brings about a political mileage to whoever is in power 
so that the project is pushed forward even when compliance with the rules and guidelines is 
compromised. 
The literature review revealed a developed system in Australia containing policies and 
guidelines at national and state levels to support the implementation of PPP projects. These 
systems are under the Infrastructure Australia for the Federal Government and for state 
governments are Partnership Victoria and Infrastructure and Structured Finance Unit (ISFU) 
for Victoria and NSW respectively. Gateway reviews are part of the review systems set to 
help project delivery from inception to operation through six assessment stages. It is in the 
first three stages where projects are at a critical stage of realization. Stage one (business need), 
both EWL and SLR projects, were aimed at easing the congestion problem in the CBDs of 
Melbourne and Sydney and therefore the projects were found to be essential to the Victorian 
and NSW governments. Stage two (business case development), includes feasibility studies 
where the economic viability, environmental challenges, financial and other aspects vital for 
the project are examined and evaluated. The environmental impact assessment on the EWL 
project revealed some critical effects that the project would create so that the Melbourne 
City Council refused to support the project and took legal action to prevent commencement 
of the project (Lidberg, 2014). At stage three (delivery strategy) which includes the project 
implementation plan and procurement process, the project plan is checked to assure all the 
required processes are followed. At this stage, all the required information to be shared with 
third parties are reviewed for a compliance check. After the completion of this stage, the 
NSW government conducts a shadow bid model (SBM) to ensure the project’s fitness for 
investment. Through this process, it appears that if ISFU had tested the correct information, 
current challenges facing the SLR project would have been captured and controlled. As 
a result, when those challenges surfaced, the project suffered delays, increased costs, and 
prolonged closure of businesses around the project area. This suggests that the government 
knew about the cost and time impact of the underground utilities. However, the government 
decided to implement a project with its shortcomings which gave a short time political gain 
until problems started to surface. Figure 1 presents the key CSF and their relationships with 
project challenges and mitigation strategies. 
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Figure 1 Relationship between critical success factors, challenges observed and 
mitigation strategies
POLITICAL INTEREST
It is argued that PPPs have a direct relation with political influence such that no public 
expenditure on PPP is granted without the necessary support from politicians (Osei-Kyei and 
Chan, 2017). Analyzing both case studies, politics played a significant role in the termination 
of the EWL project. Despite the shortcomings and court case presented by the Melbourne 
City Council against the environmental impact assessment report (Harris, 2013), the 
government proceeded with the project.  Also, as reported by the Victoria Auditor General, 
the Labour Party, then in opposition to the government, promised to cancel the project as 
part of their political campaign in the 2014 elections (VAGO, 2015).  On the other hand, the 
case of Sydney light rail does not show direct political interference. However, the accusation 
of issuing inadequate information to the private partner attracts a proposition that the 
government wanted the project to start and was afraid of the cost and duration of the project if 
the correct information was shared early with the contractor.
THE INADEQUACY OF BUSINESS CASE 
Both projects went through the rigorous process of checking and reviewing of the business 
case as required by Infrastructure Australia, Partnership Victoria for EWL and Transport 
NSW for SLR. The analysis shows that even though the business case for EWL was passed 
and the project was approved, key issues regarding the environmental impact assessment of 
the project were not resolved and the risks associated with it were undermined. Unlike EWL, 
the challenges facing the SLR project resulted from insufficient information in completing the 
risk allocation table under the National PPP Guidelines which requires the government to 
identify risk associated with ‘site’ and ‘design, construction and commissioning’ for the project 
as shown in Table 7. The contractor found utilities underneath the rail line in parts of the 
project area during execution of work and as informed earlier, the company that was named 
by the state government to remove the utilities denied having been given that job. The act 
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of the government, in this case, created unrealistic risk measurement on-site factors and on 
design and construction factors. Infrastructure Australia has been criticized for not assessing 
properly some of the business cases submitted for its review and priority status including 
EWL project, West Connex in Sydney and Cross River Rail in Brisbane (Searle and Legacy, 
2018).
Table 7 Selected project risks and their description (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2008)
Risk Description Remarks 
Site Includes any factor that may make 
the project land unsuitable for the 
intended project
Deficient 
environmental 
impact assessment 
– EWL 
Design, 
construction, and 
commissioning 
The risk that the project design, 
construction, and commissioning 
might cause adverse consequences 
to cost and/or service delivery is 
carried out.
Time and cost 
overrun - SLR
The identification of risk areas and measuring their impact on a project is the first step to 
ensuring its success (Shrestha, 2015). This step is followed by identifying the party that is 
most capable of managing that risk. If a risk cannot be managed by one party then all parties 
involved in the project could equally share the risk, to create what is known as a win-win 
situation (Schieg, 2006). 
INDEPENDENCE OF TRANSPORT AGENCIES 
Among other issues observed in EWL is non-independence of Partnership Victoria 
as a statutory entity which must deliver its obligation to the best interest of the public. 
While knowing the threat created by the opposition party, the project’s deficiencies on 
the environmental impact assessment and public outcry, Partnership Victoria assisted the 
government throughout the process up to contract agreement. The Victorian Auditor General 
(VAGO, 2015) accuses the technical team of not giving truthful advice to the decision makers. 
A professional urban planner when addressing the issue of politicians making transport 
choices commented that transportation agencies are not independent and strong enough and 
should be disconnected from politics (Alcorn, 2014). 
CHALLENGES ON TREASURY OFFICE
Infrastructure Australia, Partnership Victoria, Infrastructure NSW, and similar organizations 
in other states are all under the office of the Treasury. The departments under the Treasury 
office do all the infrastructure administrative planning, negotiation, implementation, auditing, 
and reporting. This mechanism tends to cause a blind spot in some of the key risk areas of the 
projects (English, 2006). The office of the Treasury may be inclined to certain project values 
and overlook other threats that might affect a project. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has looked at challenges facing PPP infrastructure projects in Australia. The 
case study approach was used to identify influencing factors towards the termination of the 
EWL project and challenges on the SLR project. Four factors were identified including the 
inadequacy of business cases, independence of transport agencies, political interest and limited 
objectivity in the Treasury office. The discussion on how these factors challenged the projects 
was also presented.
The discussion of the findings contributes to the need for improving and covering loopholes 
that might cause similar failures in the future. These findings suggest a need to acknowledge 
the skills of key stakeholders in multi-million-dollar projects as when they fail the public 
bears an enormous cost. As described by Osei-Kyei and Chan, (2017) political support 
attracts investments. However, if not well managed they can cause project distress. Therefore, 
continued efforts are needed to make improvements in the policies to accommodate political 
interest as part of the risk area in the National PPP Guidelines. Also, an improvement of 
public accountability is required, so that professionals dealing with project decisions are 
more accountable to the public. Finally, improving the efficiency of the Treasury office. Being 
responsible for projects’ initiation, planning, approvals, implementation, operation, auditing, 
and reporting, the Treasury office may have competing interests that limit decision making 
within its own guidelines. This study is limited in context to Australian infrastructure practices, 
with a focus on PPP infrastructure projects. However, the findings can be applied to other 
jurisdictions globally as similar problems may be experienced when undertaking infrastructure 
projects. The study suggests that there are areas under the policies and guidelines that provide 
room for some suboptimal practices to take place. Hence, apart from having political support 
as a critical success factor, political interest can also be considered as a critical success subfactor 
towards PPP delivery.
Further studies may look at how political influence can be provided as a criterion within 
gateway reviews and other decision-making processes for PPPs. Such studies may help guide 
future decision makers in reaching into well-informed decisions that are in the best interest 
of the projects and the public. Future studies can also look at how best public awareness and 
opinion in projects planning might help reduce public resistance but increase support towards 
projects.
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